War and the Moral Equality of Combatants: An Adjusted Conception

Abstract

According to a traditional account of Just War Theory, combatants are moral equals regardless of whether they are engaged in a just or unjust war. This means, roughly, that combatants on either side of the war have the same permissions to harm combatants on the other side. Traditionally, however, the scope of this principle has not been well defined. Precisely who counts as a combatant has been left in the air. Getting clear on the scope of the equally of combatants is immensely important though, if we are to act morally in war. If we only use history as a guide, the scope issue is less concerning when both sides of a conflict line up in neat rows of contradicting brightly colored uniforms, complete with flying national ensigns and bandsmen playing national songs, it would be hard to confuse either side as noncombatants. In the modern era however, this line between combatant and noncombatant cannot be drawn using easily distinguished uniforms or placement in the battle space. In fact, many modern fighters do not wear any distinguishing marking and are not claimed a nation or independent state as members of an organized armed forces. So, the question looms for the application of Just War Theory in this age of non-conventional warfare: who are the combatants that are supposed to be moral equals?