A Contextual Theory of Voter Responsibility

Abstract

This dissertation tries to contribute to the thriving debate about the duties of the voter. It attempts to construe a general theory of voter responsibility. In the way there, it makes some standalone claims: (1) that the common good is a vague and unfit concept for leading discussion, and that, at best, it hides banal statism, hence (2) that the most relevant question a theory of voter responsibility has to answer is that of what are the right reasons for voting, and (3) that pluralism entails a presumption in favor of the permissibility of some degree of apolitical life, if it can be afforded by the community. After reviewing the literature, I identify an unreconciled division regarding what reasons can aptly determine vote. I argue that, because of that, the available theories of voter responsibility are unable to capture the width of different cases and apt motivations for voting in political elections. Rather than a single, all-encompassing answer to the question of how we should vote, I propose a context-dependent theory, able to allow for prudential reasons and even failure to participate in some cases while at the same time to impose a strong duty to vote for moral reasons in others. The dissertation attempts to theoretically encapsulate the commonsense notion that there is both a striving against injustice and a striving for the better in every political decision.