Hurricanes in New York City and record droughts scalding the American breadbasket--last year might go down in history as the year when the United States woke up to the fact that climate change is here, for real. Ask nearly any policy guru how to address the climate problem and she will tell you that a market-based approach is essential to reach emission targets efficiently. We know the problem. We know the solution. But with multiple interests tugging in different directions, political paralysis, and an American public addicted to consumption, getting from point A to point B is daunting, and the chances of Congress passing legislation anytime soon specifically targeted toward climate change, at least one with teeth, is near zero. The challenge then is to use the legal framework already in place to address the problem, even if that means “jamming a square peg through a round hole.” The 2007 Supreme Court decision Massachusetts v. EPA marked the beginning of a new frontier for domestic climate change regulation in the United States. The Court held green house gases (GHGs) are covered under the U.S. Clean Air Act (CAA), giving the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to regulate climate change under the CAA. As with most new regulations, things have moved slowly since then. In the interim criticisms of the idea of regulating climate under the CAA have persisted. Few would argue that Congress’s intention in enacting the CAA was to address a global problem like climate change. Congress was addressing extreme local air pollution *1002 problems, like smog cover in Los Angeles, when it enacted the CAA. Even members of this Journal have commented on the inappropriateness of an unaltered application of the CAA to climate change. This comment noted that a strict reading of the CAA’s requirements would be unworkable as applied to GHGs, necessitating the adoption of the then proposed tailoring rule. Ideally, an enforceable global compact where all nations participate in a non-voluntary system would be initiated to address climate change. Congress, acknowledging the overwhelming scientific evidence in favor of climate change, would implement legislation specifically addressing the United State’s commitment to the international treaty. Things have not developed this way, and in all likelihood will not for some time. Even though the CAA is not an ideal structure for addressing climate change, it is the most feasible option currently available domestically for making serious progress in reducing GHG emissions. In light of the recent D.C. Circuit Court decision, Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, which approved the EPA’s tailoring rule, it is now appropriate to reexamine the CAA as applied to domestic regulation of climate change and weigh options available for market-based regulation of GHGs. This Comment argues that Responsible Regulation opens the door for the United States to gradually implement a national cap-and-trade system, which can eventually be incorporated into a global cap-and-trade system.

Fifty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down the most important decision in the State of Arizona’s history. Arizona v. California allocated the flow of the Colorado River among the three Lower Basin states (Arizona, California, and Nevada) according to terms of the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA). Arizonans rejoiced. However, Arizona’s reaction seems perplexing, given that the State spent decades denouncing the BCPA. Arizona challenged the BCPA numerous times in the Supreme Court and engaged in fierce political battles to block its implementation. This Article explores this riddle by reviewing the legal and political events leading up to Arizona v. California. Ultimately, the Article concludes that the decision was a victory for Arizona because, while Arizona had engaged in a strategy of obstruction, California had steadily been using more of the Colorado River’s flow. California’s use eventually was well above the amount allocated to it in the BCPA--water that would otherwise have gone to Arizona. To secure legal rights to water that California was already putting to a beneficial use, Arizona needed to convince the Supreme Court to depart from established precedent for determining interstate water disputes and ratify the notion that Congress could and had allocated an interstate stream among states. The decision’s impact on Arizona cannot be overstated. On its heels came Congressional approval of the Central Arizona Project, which allowed Phoenix and Tucson to develop into major population and economic centers. But the conflict over how to divide the River is far from over. A growing population and the uncertain yet tangible effects of climate change bring new water challenges to the Colorado River Basin.

Glen Canyon Dam has had a dramatic impact on the American West. Originally constructed to provide a steady water supply and cheap hydropower to downstream consumers, dam managers have recently been forced to balance newfound environmental, recreational, and tribal concerns alongside more traditional water delivery and power generation interests. Like all natural resource allocation questions on public lands, decision making in Grand Canyon is constrained by the public interest. In a place as sacred and iconic as Grand Canyon where interests are diverse and complex, finding the proper balance among competing interests is no easy task. To help ensure that Glen Canyon Dam is operated in a manner consistent with both federal mandates and the public interest, Glen Canyon Dam operators have increasingly relied on recommendations from an arguably unrepresentative group of interested stakeholders as a proxy for the public interest. The result has been management decisions that have historically favored hydropower and water delivery interests at the expense of important environmental, cultural, recreational, and aesthetic resources. Input from a stakeholder group can be a valuable resource, but only if the group is truly representative, in relevant proportions, to the interests at stake. As currently configured, the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Working Group fails to adequately represent all interests affected by Glen Canyon Dam operations. Through an expanded stakeholder group, however, important environmental, recreational, and cultural resources of Grand Canyon can be afforded the protection deserving of a place that is a crown jewel of our national park system, the lifeblood of millions of westerners, and the most sacred of places for many western Tribes.

This Article recounts the background leading Arizona to seek determination of its rights to use the water of the Colorado River in the U.S. Supreme Court, the arguments of Arizona and California, the Special Master’s Report, and the Court’s decision in 1963. It turns to a consideration of the decision’s significance fifty years later. First it considers key developments in the basin since 1963 that are consequences of the decision. It argues that, by disregarding the allocation structure put in place by the 1922 Colorado River Compact and by focusing solely on the main Colorado River, the decision resulted in unsustainable overuse of an increasingly constrained water supply in the Lower Basin.

The jaguar (Panthera onca) roams the Southwest boundary region of the United States, Mexico, and tribal nations, particularly in southeastern Arizona and northeastern Sonora. This transboundary species - walking across numerous political borders - has remained elusive and controversial. Those who care about the preservation of the species want to learn all they can so that political action can be taken. This requires information about the jaguar, but the federal and state governments do not give all of the information they have, and the tribal governments say little. Knowing the exact locations of jaguars is not necessary for the preservation of jaguars. Tribes can be trusted to take care of jaguars on reservation lands. To support that thesis, this Article details how information about the jaguar flows - or not - among federal, state, local, and *188 tribal governments, as well as the public that may want the information. Despite many government and media reports generally omitting tribal reservations from the discussion, this Article also explains how many of the historical and recent sightings and confirmations of jaguars in Arizona have occurred on or near tribal reservations, and that jaguars still could be on reservation land. This supports the notion that tribes not only know these jaguars exist, but also know how to care for them. Finally, environmental information policy may require some secrecy at times to make certain endangered species are protected, but policy-making outside of the public gaze must not be a permanent situation, even when it involves tribes.

Solar electricity is booming. Every 4 minutes a solar electric system is installed on the rooftop of a U.S. home. It is predicted that 2013 will be the first year annual U.S. solar installations will surpass 100,000 systems. This surge has resulted in the U.S. increasing its share of global solar installations from 5 percent in 2008 to 13 percent in 2013. In fact, U.S. solar installations may reach a staggering 3,300 megawatts in 2013, establishing the U.S. as the 4th largest solar market in the world. Solar advocates believe these impressive numbers demonstrate a shift to solar power that will result in undeniable environmental benefits and help break U.S. dependence on fossil fuels. However, a growing number of critics contend that solar is being “propped up” by unsustainable policies and incentives that shift the costs of solar to others. Non-solar consumers and utilities have a legitimate gripe. Lawmakers in several leading solar states have recognized these claims and are taking corrective action.

On February 3, 2014, the Colorado House of Representatives passed House Bill 14-1026, titled “A Bill for an Act Concerning the Authorization of Flexible Water Markets.” 1 If the Colorado Senate passes the law, it would allow agricultural water right holders who choose to reduce their consumptive use of water to apply for a change in use for the unused portion of their water right. A change in use is a legal process that allows a holder of a water right to change the type of use historically associated with that water right. For example, if an alfalfa farmer historically uses 100 acre-feet of water annually to irrigate crops, the farmer could only use 80 acre-feet annually and reduce the amount of water she uses to irrigate her alfalfa by 20 acre-feet. Then, under the proposed legislation, the farmer could receive a flex decree for this unused portion; the alfalfa farmer would receive a flex decree for 20 acre-feet. The proposed legislation would then allow the farmer to transfer 20 acre-feet of her water right for use by a third-party without enumerating a specific beneficial use to which the water will be applied.2 In the case of the hypothetical alfalfa farmer, the proposed bill would allow her to transfer 20 acre-feet of her water right for use by a municipal water district, and this would be allowed even though she did not specify in her application that this specific municipality would be the end user of her flex water right. Critics of this pending legislation argue that the bill will encourage water speculation and serve to wreak havoc on Colorado’s agricultural communities. However, proponents of the bill note that it will allow for more efficient consumption of state water resources, incentivize more sustainable agricultural practices, and establish a market-based approach to allocate the state’s scarce water resources. After briefly summarizing relevant Colorado water law and exploring the content of this pending bill, this Comment argues that this bill should be celebrated as model legislation for future Western water policy, and that it should be commended as a creative legislative attempt to more efficiently allocate Colorado’s scare water resources.