In commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Wilderness Act, we examine what might be the next chapter in wilderness politics, designation, and management. In Parts I and II of the Article, we review the base of wilderness-eligible lands managed by the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management. These two parts evaluate inventoried roadless areas, lands with wilderness characteristics, wilderness study areas, and recommended wilderness areas. These are the lands from which future wilderness and other protected land designations may come, and we analyze the interim management measures, planning processes, and politics that determine whether or not these lands will be protected in the future. In Part III, we examine three interrelated factors that will largely shape future wilderness politics: extreme political polarization, the use of collaboration, and increasing demands for the manipulation of wilderness areas. Congressional polarization may push wilderness politics onto different political pathways, including action by the executive branch aimed at protecting wilderness-eligible lands. Outside of Congress, collaboration will also continue to shape wilderness politics in the future, with questions focused on the scope and degree of compromise in wilderness legislation. There will also be increasing demands to control and manipulate wilderness in the future. These three factors will complicate the politics surrounding future wilderness designations and influence how these lands are managed in the future. Yet despite these challenges, the reasons for adding to the Wilderness Preservation System are stronger in 2014 than they were fifty years ago.

The Colorado River is one of the most important rivers in the world. The river’s 1,400-mile journey from the Rocky Mountains to the Sea of Cortez takes on waters from seven states and from the reservations of twenty-eight Indian tribes along the way, 244,000 square miles of river basin in all. The Colorado River is also heavily managed: Its waters are allocated through a complex body of laws collectively referred to as the “Law of the River,” which includes an international treaty, two interstate water compacts, numerous federal and state statutes, and more than a dozen Indian water rights settlements. For thousands of years before the Law of the River, however, American Indians lived and irrigated within the Colorado River Basin, making due with its characteristically seasonal rains and difficult growing conditions. Today, in a cruel but all-too-common twist for tribes, twelve of the basin’s twenty-eight tribes have not had their water rights completely quantified, leaving many of the basin’s oldest inhabitants without a legally secure source of water. This begs the question of how the Law of the River developed such that the Colorado River is already over-allocated but Indian water rights are to a large extent unaccounted for, and tribes--occupying and using water in the basin since time immemorial--are left struggling for whatever remaining drops they can squeeze out of the basin. And, perhaps more to the point, the question arises how Arizona v. California recognized this exact issue in the Lower Colorado River Basin and could not to fully resolve it. This article finally takes the position that tribes, the states, and the federal government must work together to settle Indian water rights claims to provide certainty to all Colorado River basin water users amidst growing undertainty from polulation growth and climate change.

Within environmental philosophy there has been much effort to determine precisely why we should protect wilderness and other natural areas. There have been many theories and much controversy. Should natural areas be protected for the sake of recreation and other benefits these areas provide to humans, the anthropocentric approach? Many ethicists prefer the biocentric approach, according to which natural areas should be protected for the sake of benefits these areas provide not only to humans, but also to other species. In this paper, I argue that we should adopt a more pragmatic perspective. The American public is overwhelmingly in favor of preserving natural areas and native biodiversity. This has been shown in a number of opinion surveys. I argue that the proper foundation for natural area preservation in the U.S. is the deep affinity many Americans feel toward natural areas and other species. Simply put, Americans love nature. Our response to nature is primarily emotional rather than intellectual. As surveys show, citizens believe that natural areas should provide a wide variety of benefits, benefits to humans and also benefits to other species. This should be expected and encouraged in our pluralistic society. There are no incorrect reasons why we should protect natural areas. Environmental policymaking in the U.S. is especially problematic since we must accommodate, as well as possible, the various uses citizens wish to see provided by federally owned natural areas.

In the years since renewable energy technologies were deployed as an alternative eney source, solar eney continues to aid in reducing carbon dioxide emissions. To date, solar technologies are emerging as an increasingyl useful source of elecricit. Additionaly, solar technologies also provide signjcant benefits to the environment as well as various solar stakeholders across the nation. Of particular importance here, photovoltaic technologies (common'y known as 'olar panels" or 'olar sstems') are espeaialy useful to the residential solar sstem model. Although this residential modelprovides the aforementioned significant benefits, as solar stakeholders consider shifting from using the traditional net metering rate design to the newer value of solar tanjf ith the residential model, they must also consider the federal income tax consequences of such a shift. Thus, this paper examines the importance of the resident-utiit agreement's structure in assessing the feasibiiy of this shit. J