In recent years as scholars have begun to strenuously study and evaluate the performance of written constitutions, the role of constitution-making processes in that venture is coming to the fore. Some scholars argue that the design of processes through which constitutions are written may have a bearing on the expected endurance and functioning of these important documents. In other words, the performance of constitutions is more pertinent, in some respects, to how they are produced than to what is actually written in them. In this paper, I evaluate constitution-making processes in Afghanistan and explore the role these processes played in producing “successful,” enduring constitutions. Specifically, I examine why some constitution-making processes in this country produced stable and enduring constitutions, whereas others crumbled before agreement on basic questions could be forged or begot short-lived, “failed” constitutions. I also highlight what role political elites, short-term partisan bargaining, and interests played in these constitution-making processes. Finally, I probe why many constitutions in Afghanistan have died young and why the death of constitutions has been violent.